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The adoption of open architecture has several economic implications in the life of an asset, including
developmental, production, storage, training and maintenance costs. This research responds to an
inquiry by the Program Executive Ofﬁcer—Integrated Weapons System (US Department of the Navy)
regarding the value of open architecture (OA) in the design of complex assets. With this intent, we
evaluate how the inventory allocation of spare engines for the F-16 operations in the continental United
States would be affected with and without the adoption of open architecture, focusing on the beneﬁts of
inventory pooling to meet the demand of many users from a small number of storage sites. We use a
distance-constrained version of the Ardalan heuristic for solving the facility location problem,
responding to practical limitations exposed by the model. This article shows that open architecture
may provide substantial supply chain cost reduction, and simpliﬁcation of the distribution network
when combined with proper inventory storage policies.
Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
The combined use of commonality and modularity in product
design has allowed automobiles, aircraft, computers and a host of
other machines (including most military systems) to be reusable
beyond their ﬁrst lifecycle and to be given many more years of
operation. This versatility substantially impacts the availability
and maintenance cost of many durable assets. Modularity enables
the division of the product development effort among many
specialists (ﬁrms or individuals), ensuring the development of the
most advanced and competitive systems. Modularity facilitates
the separation of component-wear phenomena as the system
ages, enabling maintenance professionals to locate and repair
damaged modules without affecting the integrity of other
modules in the system.
Commonality, however, presents a disadvantage that many
engineers will recognize: the adoption of common design in a
competitive environment hinders creativity and innovation in
product development; suppliers of high-technology products
would prefer to develop their own designs than to share them
with competitors. The design team would rather showcase its
capabilities, especially in the development of advanced systems or
in the adoption of new technologies. Hence, while modularity
remains a powerful product-development philosophy that brings
agility and cost reduction to product design, the adoption of
common designs for complex products may be not the best
approach to system acquisition—especially in circumstances
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requiring the development of advanced technologies. In these
scenarios, the traditional ‘‘commonality’’ must be enhanced with
the adoption of ‘‘open architecture’’ features—allowing modules
from competing sources to be used in the same system, without
constraining the creativity and innovation from the designers
involved in the development of the module.
Open architecture provides the opportunity to introduce
product aggregation, one of the three aggregation (or pooling)
approaches to managing and improving supply-chain performance, along with time aggregation and place aggregation.
Product aggregation is intended to reduce product variety without
compromising the functionality required by the user.
The purpose of this case study is to evaluate open architecture
as the design philosophy for the acquisition of complex systems
with advanced technologies. This is done by analyzing the case of
the F-16 spare engines, showcasing the cost beneﬁts that the
US Air Force might be enjoying today had the aircraft engine
suppliers been required to adopt open architecture. This study
assumes that a complex system (such as the Joint Strike Fighter,
or other weapon systems acquired by the uniformed services of
the US Department of Defense) is a combination of hardware and
software components that may be acquired from multiple
developers or suppliers. This study proposes that the adoption
of open architecture in the acquisition of these systems can
substantially reduce the costs of these programs.
Next section describes the problem that motivated this study,
and Section 3 explains how open architecture affects product
development and life-cycle management. Section 4 describes
current inventory management policy and allocation of F-16 spare
engines at Air Force bases in the contiguous United States. Section
5 introduces a brief literature review of the methodology used to
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rationalize F-16 spare engine allocation. Section 6 analyzes the
case under three scenarios: the benchmark scenario, which is
based on current policy, a scenario with limited inventory
pooling, and a third scenario with open architecture of engine
design. Section 7 presents the conclusions and suggestions for
future research.

2. Motivation: F-16 alternative engines
Modularity facilitates the development of new systems using
modules that were previously designed and developed for other
systems, providing major time and cost savings product development initiative that can exploit these beneﬁts. Moreover, because
of commonality, high-value modules in a system may be
recovered at the end of the system’s life and used in another
product—a process often called cannibalization. In the case of
complex models with high engineering content, such as aircraft
turbines, it may be desirable to have multiple suppliers offering
competing designs, which could be accomplished with the
adoption of open architecture. The Defense Acquisition University
(2006) deﬁnes open architecture as follows:
The conﬂuence of business and technical practices yielding
modular, interoperable systems that adhere to open standards
with published interfaces. This approach signiﬁcantly increases opportunities for innovation and competition, enables
reuse of components, facilitates rapid technology insertion,
and reduces maintenance constraints.
Modularity and commonality are the two aspects in product
design that support the adoption of an open architecture. They
facilitate the execution of an agile product development program
with a wide-reaching product line that meets the requirements of
multiple users with different needs. The renewed emphasis on
open architecture allows strategic resource allocation, facilitating
the acquisition of better assets with lower costs. A current
example of this design approach is the F-35 Lightning II,
Joint Strike Fighter, a multi-role aircraft currently in production
for the uniformed services of the US Department of Defense (DoD)
and for many of the US allies. The Federation of American
Scientists (2005a) indicates that among its strengths, ‘‘JSF y
will capitalize on commonality and modularity to maximize
affordability.’’
In practice, previous developments and acquisitions of weapon
systems by the DoD usually did not have this focus. For instance,
Pratt & Whitney (P&W) and General Electric Aircraft Engines
(GEAE) produce engines for the F-16 aircraft used by the US Air
Force and a few foreign military forces. The P&W F100-PW-200
aircraft engine was originally selected over GEAEs as the sole
source engine for the F-16. The original F-16 was designed as a
lightweight, air-to-air day-ﬁghter. Air-to-ground responsibilities
transformed the ﬁrst production F-16s into multi-role ﬁghters.
The ﬁrst operational F-16A was delivered in January 1979 to the
388th Tactical Fighter Wing at Hill Air Force Base, Utah. The
delivery of 2200 + aircraft to the US Air Force continued until
March 2001 (Federation of American Scientists, 2005b).
The decision to choose an alternate ﬁghter engine for the F-16
led to the development of the General Electric Aviation Engine’s
F110 series. With the implementation of the Alternative Fighter
Engine competition for the F-16 in 1985, GEAE ﬁelded the F110GE-100 version to compete with Pratt & Whitney’s F100-PW-220
engine. Throughout the production of the F-16, the performance
requirements for both suppliers were identical, but the engines
delivered were not interchangeable. In fact, the airframe manufacturer, Lockheed-Martin, had to deliver structurally different
frames to use the different engines. For example, aircraft with

production numbers ending in zero are designed and built with
signiﬁcantly larger air intake to accept the GEAE F110 series
engine. Aircraft with production numbers ending in two are
designed and built with smaller air intake to use the P&W F100
series engine. Each engine type (GEAE or P&W) uses different
control software (with implications in the cockpit controls and
pilot training), requiring unique airframe interface. With the
exception of the engine, the airframe interface and the control
software, aircraft of the same generation would otherwise be
identical.
The adoption of two engine suppliers for the F-16 ﬁghter
aircraft was intended to eliminate the monopoly held by Pratt &
Whitney as the sole-source engine supplier for that aircraft.
However, allowing the newcomer (GEAE) to design a product
that was not interchangeable with the existing engine did
not eliminate some of the monopoly effects in the long-term,
and created costly logistics constraints.
Similar to the F-16 acquisition experience in the 1980s and
the 1990s, the ongoing acquisition process of the Joint Strike
Fighter includes the development of two competing power plants:
the Pratt & Whitney F135, and the GEAE F136, developed in
partnership with Rolls-Royce. On its website, the Federation of
American Scientists states that the F-35 propulsion systems will
be ‘‘physically and functionally interchangeable in both the
aircraft and support systems.’’ According to the Joint Strike
Fighter Program Ofﬁce, ‘‘the F135 and F136 teams are working
closely to develop common propulsion system components’’ (F-35
JSF Program, 2007).
In this study, we analyze current usage data of P&W and GEAE
spare engines held in various bases in the continental United
States to support the F-16 operations to identify substantial cost
reduction from the pooling effects that could be achieved with the
use of better inventory allocation (place aggregation), as well as
the adoption of open architecture (product aggregation). One
important caveat exists, however: considering the limited amount
of usable data available about the acquisition and use of these
aircraft, the reader is cautioned that this analysis is not a critique
of the acquisition of the F-16 aircraft or its engines. Rather, it
intends to discuss how it would have beneﬁted had it adopted
open architecture.

3. Open architecture as a design approach to simplify the
supply chain
This section presents open architecture and how it generally
beneﬁts product design. The concept stems from the development
approach used by many software houses, in which sub-routines
(modules) are developed by individual designers having only two
major constraints: the functionality (i.e., the sub-routine does
what is expected to do) and the standardized interface with the
main program (i.e., the sub-routine has seamless integration with
other modules in the software).
Nelson (2007) indicates that open architecture principles have
been around since at least 1981, when IBM developed its personal
computer. The design of the IBM-PC was a major breakthrough in
that it was made of a set of physical modules that could be
replaced by similar modules of different design, make or
performance, as long as they satisﬁed a limited set of interface
requirements and fulﬁlled the expected functions. For example, a
hard disk drive of a given capacity and make could be upgraded
by another hard disk of different make and greater capacity, as
long as it satisﬁed a simple set of interface constraints. By
contrast, one is not usually able to replace the engine of an
automobile by one from a different maker, even if the two have
similar performance, size or functionality.
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The open architecture design philosophy was extremely
successful for desktop computers, and it still describes most
desktop computers built almost 30 years later. In contrast,
proprietary designs have lead to expensive and less successful
products in the computer industry—such as the computer Amiga
that preceded the IBM-PC, the short-lived Unix desktop, and
various generations of the Macintosh desktop. With the exception
of the IBM-PC, the adoption of open architecture in computer
hardware design is limited. Space and weight limitations have
restricted the use of open architecture in the design of laptop
computers. Hence, internal components developed for one
particular laptop usually cannot be used in a different model
or brand. Open architecture beneﬁts have been usually restricted
to the interfaces with external accessories and, in some cases, to
memory units.
It is important not to confuse open architecture with ‘‘open
source’’ (Coar, 2006). Software developed under an open source
philosophy is copyright-free and can be modiﬁed and extended by
any other software writer, as exempliﬁed by the Linux operating
system and the Mozilla web browser. Nonetheless, to enable
continued expansion, open source software usually adopts open
architecture as the means to ensure a compatible interface
between the works of multiple authors.
In 2006, the US Navy released the Open Architecture Contract
Notebook, explicating the open architecture guidelines to be
adopted by Acquisition Ofﬁcers (PEO-IWS, 2006). Speciﬁcally, it is
recommended that contracts include this statement: ‘‘The Contractor will be required to deﬁne, document, and follow an open
systems approach for using modular design, standards-based
interfaces, and widely supported consensus-based standards’’
(p. 7). While these recommendations usually target software
design, they can be quite useful in the design and acquisition of all
complex hardware. The adoption of open architecture principles
in hardware design provide some of the same beneﬁts found in
software design, in addition to the following:
1 Simpliﬁed maintenance: the modularity found in open
architecture products makes it easier to remove, replace and
repair damaged modules with minimal impact to the whole
system.
2 Simpliﬁed logistics: open architecture enables the use of
modules by different makes, or even different generations, if
they maintain the same interface standards.
3 Reduced acquisition cost: open architecture allows a true
competition between potential suppliers in all phases of the
lifecycle of the product, requiring just that each potential
supplier adopt the standard module interfaces.
These beneﬁts become more critical when we realize that
many complex assets depend on the successful integration of
multiple hardware and software modules. The determination of
standard interfaces between modules allows substantial savings
in the operation and maintenance of weapon systems, as
illustrated by the F-16 aircraft engine. In some cases, an engine
or engine components (modules) may be removed and transported to Tinker Air Force Base (AFB), the maintenance depot for
F-16 engines, without any maintenance action by local technicians. In other cases, local technicians may be capable of
performing the required maintenance action locally and returning
the engine to operable or Ready for Issue (RFI) status.
The managers of active duty air force bases aggressively track
the status of engine changes. They expect turnaround of less than
24 hours from each engine change operation, which requires
keeping a certain inventory of spare engines readily available.
This culture seems to contrast with Air National Guard (ANG) and
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Air Force Reserve (AFR) units, in which the F-16 aircraft are used
less intensively. Guard and Reserve units typically have fewer
assigned aircraft and, therefore, have a lower spare engine stock.
However, given that their primary mission is the defense of the
national air space, they too can beneﬁt from having a short engine
maintenance turnaround.
The US Air Force uses the F-16 in 30 bases of various sizes,
including Active Duty (AD), Air Force Reserve (AFR) and Air
National Guard (ANG). Each base has its own stock of spare
engines to meet demand. Some of the bases use aircraft with GE
engines; others use aircraft with P&W engines. As explained
earlier, bases do not use engines of different make in their ﬂeets
because they are not interchangeable in any way. The most
notable differences associated with the two power plants are as
follows:
1 Airframes are structurally different, with a distinct engine bay
for each engine make.
2 Engines have different durability and reliability, leading to
distinct preventive maintenance needs.
3 Repair parts, maintenance jigs and tools are different.
4 The software that controls engine performance and interprets
the pilot’s command from the cockpit is different.
5 Aircraft using different engines respond differently to the
pilot’s commands. This mandates a non-trivial period of
adaptation when a pilot switches from one aircraft type to
the other.
In short, because of different design choices made by the
engine manufacturers, we have effectively two distinct aircraft
types in service under the codename F-16. This creates undesirable limitations in the way aircraft and engines are used and
maintained. The open architecture design approach would
effectively eliminate many of the differences between the two
engines, without constraining the creativity and ﬂexibility of the
design engineer.

4. Case description: F-16 spare engine storage
This section describes the inventory management of the F-16
spare engines, as practiced by US Air Force bases using this
aircraft. The expected demand for spare engines was 656 P&W
engines and 773 GEAE engines in 2008, reﬂecting a negative trend
of approximately 5.8% per year since 2001. Demand originates in
13 bases using Pratt & Whitney-powered aircraft, and 18 bases
using General Electric-powered aircraft in the Continental United
States. In general, these bases hold a total pre-positioned
inventory of 159 spare engines, turning the inventory fewer than
9 times per year. Table 1 shows the historic demand in each base,
next to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) code
of the respective airﬁeld. Based on a simple linear regression of
the 8-year demand in each of the 31 bases, the forecasted demand
for year 2008 is also shown in the table. As we can observe,
approximately half of the forecasted demand is fragmented across
24 Air National Guard (ANG) bases, and the remainder is
distributed in four Active Duty (AD) bases; a small demand is
generated in two Air Force Reserve (AFR) bases. Each base has
different capabilities to provide engine maintenance, with all the
complexity that such maintenance entails. In general, the ADs
have the support personnel and equipment to give some service,
while the ANGs and AFRs have limited maintenance
infrastructure. Notice that four ANG bases are co-located with
AD bases (Andrews AFB (DC), Kelly AFB (NM), Buckley AFB (CO)
and Kirtland AFB (NM)), where valuable synergies regarding
engine maintenance can be expected.
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Table 1
Historic demand of F100 and F110 engines.
Sources: Historic data adapted from Henderson and Higer (2007) and http://www.f-16.net. Forecast by the author.
Pratt & Whitney (F100 engine)
Base

ANG-Burlington VT
ANG-Duluth MN
ANG-Des Moines IA
ANG-Ellington TX
ANG-Fresno CA
ANG-Ft Smith AR
ANG-Ft Wayne IN
Hill AFB-Depot UT
Nellis AFB NV
Luke AFB AZ
Tinker AFB OK
ANG-Toledo OH
ANG-Tulsa OK
ANG-Tucson AZ

ICAO

‘01

‘02

‘03

‘04

‘05

‘06

‘07

2008 forecast
Mean

Std err
6.5
7.1
5.7
5.7
10.3
10.2
7.3
6.5
17.7
19.1
0.0
4.4
4.5
14.1

BTV
DLH
DSM
EFD
FAT
FSM
FWA
HIF
LSV
LUF
TIK
TOL
TUL
TUS

52
49
40
38
57
34
38
56
88
365
0
44
43
209

39
52
37
53
35
33
37
71
57
355
0
35
34
160

51
56
32
42
41
27
33
64
92
344
0
24
21
176

48
38
28
38
45
36
47
54
90
327
0
24
22
153

43
30
12
39
36
39
23
67
97
338
0
13
21
126

31
27
25
33
34
29
28
67
66
273
0
18
18
102

40
33
13
37
55
5
29
67
60
250
0
7
9
107

34.9
23.0
8.9
33.4
41.4
17.1
25.7
67.7
69.9
248.1
0.0
1.3
4.9
80.1

ICAO

‘01

‘02

‘03

‘04

‘05

‘06

‘07

2008 forecast

General Electric (F110 engine)
Base

ANG-Albuquerque NM
ANG-Eggharbor NJ
ANG-Andrews DC
ANG-Buckley CO
Cannon AFB NM
ANG-Sioux SD
ANG-Gt Falls MT
Hill AFB UT
AFR-Homestead FL
ANG-Montgomery AL
ANG-Madison WI
ANG-Selfridge MI
AFR-Ft Worth TX
ANG-Richmond VA
ANG-Springﬁeld OH
ANG-Kelly TX
ANG-Springﬁeld IL
ANG-Syracuse NY
Tinker AFB OK

ABQ
ACY
ADW
BKF
CVS
FSD
GTF
HIF
HST
MGM
MSN
MTC
NFW
RIC
SGH
SKF
SPI
SYR
TIK

48
44
33
40
175
42
33
245
40
39
45
65
47
36
53
61
33
0
0

40
53
39
33
153
60
45
201
31
30
33
45
40
42
64
49
19
0
0

45
51
26
48
126
49
47
225
41
50
33
47
41
37
63
46
24
31
0

To prevent shortage, which would affect the readiness of the
respective base, a base-stock inventory management policy is
adopted such that a prescribed level of inventory is kept at each
based. The Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, located at Tinker
AFB, provides ‘‘supply chain management, including acquisition,
repair, storage, distribution, disposal and the technical and
engineering services for the center’s assigned engines,’’ which
include major maintenance activities for the F100 and F110
engines (Tinker AFB, 2007). This depot is conveniently located in
the center of the country, but only seven bases are within 1-day
driving range (approximately 550 miles)—an important consideration since managers expect to maintain the base stock at all
times. Traveling time to other bases is as long as 3 days. Hence,
the lead time for an order placed from each base is typically
between 5 and 7 business days, depending on the distance to the
customer and provided that Tinker has the engine in stock ready
for issue.
The US Air Force propulsion requirements determine the spare
engine inventory level, adding a safety stock based on the demand
variability and on the service level associated with the user’s
priority. This service level depends on the primary assignment for

39
53
21
39
102
42
55
236
32
46
33
51
20
36
57
56
27
38
0

27
38
34
33
93
43
46
202
34
26
28
37
38
20
43
50
23
35
0

38
20
29
28
99
45
53
230
26
45
25
43
26
25
54
49
31
33
0

37
22
26
29
65
42
29
220
33
34
36
33
27
6
56
46
34
39
0

Mean

Std Err

31.3
19.4
25.0
27.4
48.9
41.0
44.4
217.0
28.4
37.3
26.4
30.1
21.1
8.7
51.3
45.1
31.0
38.5
0.0

5.6
9.5
6.0
6.0
11.3
6.6
10.6
17.8
4.7
9.8
5.6
6.6
7.5
7.0
7.2
5.0
5.7
3.3
0.0

each location: either combat (80% service level), or training (70%
service level). All F-16 users in this study are considered combat
units—except those located at Luke AFB (AZ), a training base
(Henderson and Higer, 2007). The demand variability is caused by
two random variables that regulate the queuing system at the
Tinker AFB maintenance depot:
1 Number of hours ﬂown per month: this drives the actual
demand seen at the depot.
2 Maintenance service time: this drives the waiting time until an
engine can be serviced.
The asset utilization randomness drives the need for a safety
stock. Considering the forecasted demand for 2008, and the unit
prices of $3.27M (P&W) and $2.95M (GEAE), the recommended
safety stock in all bases is worth $123.9M, as shown in Table 2.
This base stock policy meets the forecasted demand according to
the current practice of each base keeping its own inventory. The
difference between the base stock and the safety stock
(86 40 ¼46) is the sum of the expected lead-time demand in
each site.
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Table 2
Inventory distribution according to category and make
Inventory status: each base stores its own replacement engines

Annual demand
Base stock
Safety stock
Safety stock value

P&W

GEAE

Total

656
38
18
$58.9

773
48
22
$65.0

1429
86
40
$123.9

5. Warehouse location and related literature
As discussed in the previous section, the USAF currently
manages the inventory of spare engines without taking advantage
of any pooling beneﬁt. An alternative approach would be to hold
the inventory in select bases within acceptable distance. The
selection of sites that should hold inventory is characterized as
the p-median problem; this section presents some of its early
literature.
The p-median problem can be described as a process for
identifying p facilities to serve customers in n nodes of a network
(pon). Finding a limited number of Air Force bases to store spare
engines for all bases in the Continental United States would
be a p-median problem with special characteristics, which we
describe later. The heuristics to solve the p-median problem
usually strive to ﬁnd the minimum transportation time, given the
respective demands. As Reese (2005) described in his bibliography, there are four primary approaches to the facility location
problem, and the p-median is one of them, along with the p-center,
the incapacitated facility location and the quadratic assignment
problems. The p-median problem is a location–allocation problem,
because it ﬁnds the supply nodes and allocates the customers that
should be served by each of them.
The unconstrained p-median problem seems to have been
ﬁrst described by Hakimi (1965). Toregas et al. (1971) formulated
the constrained problem as a mixed integer program, and
many researchers have attempted to solve both the constrained
and unconstrained problems using either approximate heuristics,
or exact branch-and-bound, or Lagrangean relaxation algorithms.
A large number of heuristics were developed to solve speciﬁc
variations of the problem; we focus on four of them.
Kuehn and Hamburger (1963) proposed a greedy heuristics
and tested it using a simple data set that became standard to test
other solutions. This was later described as an add heuristics,
because it assigns facilities to locations successively, as they
improve market coverage and reduce transportation cost. Teitz
and Bart (1968) proposed a replacement heuristics: from an
initial arbitrary allocation of p facilities, the remaining locations
are successively tested as replacements for elements in the
original set if they improve performance, or they are disregarded
if they don’t. This heuristics does not have distance constraint
capability; rather, the manager has to ﬁnd the solution with
increasing number of nodes until all facilities are served from a
node within the distance constraint. Khumawala (1972) proposed
two greedy heuristics that he called ‘‘delta’’ and ‘‘omega’’, both of
them incorporating distance constraints. Delta is an elimination
heuristics that starts with the whole pool of locations, and
gradually eliminates, one at a time, those that cost the least to
shut down, until none can be eliminated without violating the
distance constraint. Omega is an add heuristic that gradually
selects from the pool of locations, one at a time, those that provide
greatest cost reduction, considering the facilities already open.
Facilities are added until the constraint is met for all customers.
For reviews, see Vidal and Goetschalckx (1997), Beamon (1998),
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Erenguc et al. (1999), Sarmiento and Nagi (1999), Reese (2005)
and Nagy and Salhi (2007).
Ardalan (1988) compared the performance of the Kuehn
and Hamburger (1963) heuristics with the ones originally
proposed by Khumawala, also considered efﬁcient and simple to
implement. They were compared against the optimal solution
under several location–allocation scenarios, with customer locations varying from 10 to 40 nodes from which 3 or 4 supply
sources would be allocated using either heuristics; a total of 14
different scenarios. Each problem was replicated 50 times with
each heuristics. Ardalan found that the proposed heuristics
performed better than Khumawala’s in almost every situation
examined, except in one case, the selection of 4 supply nodes from
10 customer locations. Given the impact of this study, the KuehnHamburger heuristics has since been known as the Ardalan
heuristics, being included in several operations management
textbooks.
Rahman and Smith (1991) and Chaudhry et al. (1995)
compared Teitz and Bart (1968) and the Ardalan (1988) heuristics,
with and without maximum distance constraints, using a variety
of data sets. Although Ardalan generally provided worse solutions
than Teitz-Bart, it should be noted that Teitz-Bart had to be
applied several times with different random seeds before the best
objective value was eventually found. Summarizing the comparative studies, we have the following:

 Ardalan’s heuristics is superior to Teitz-Bart’s in problems with
fewer customers and distance constraints.

 Ardalan’s is more powerful than Khumawala’s in problems


with 10–40 customers and 3 or 4 nodes, except when more
nodes are desired for fewer customers.
Teitz-Bart’s is generally superior to Ardalan’s in problems with
30–75 customers without distance constraint.

These comparisons are not enough to indicate that any
particular heuristic is the best. Since Teitz-Bart’s is cumbersome
for treating problems with distance constraints, the most
appropriate selection in these cases should be one of Khumawala’s
heuristics or Ardalan’s heuristic.

6. Analysis: three approaches to spare engines storage
The following section presents a centralized storage solution
for the spare engine inventory problem, a lower bound that
ignores distance and time constraints. Then it uses the Ardalan
heuristic to select the bases that should hold the inventory of each
engine type separately, or both engine types together. We select
Ardalan’s method for two reasons: it is the easiest to incorporate
distance constraint using MS Excel, and it is better than
Khumawala’s in problems with lower customer-to-node ratio.
All approaches in this section meet an 85% service level in all
bases at a lower cost than what is currently practiced by the Air
Force.
6.1. Centralized storage
It is a well-known statistical fact that when two independent
random variables are added, the resulting variable is proportionally less variable, provided that the variables are not correlated.
Recent demand data for the F-16 replacement engines (Table 1)
show that the changes in demand in the bases do not follow any
particular pattern that would suggest a correlation. Demand
increased in some bases, decreased in others, and oscillated
randomly in most of them. A direct veriﬁcation of the two-way
correlation between the 30 bases shows that most of them ﬁt in
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the range from  0.2 to + 0.5. For all we know, the variations in
demand were not driven by a common policy that affected all
bases in the same way each year. Rather, local policies affected the
changes separately and thus, there is prior expectation that the
coefﬁcient of variation of the joint demand of multiple bases is
lower than the coefﬁcient of variation of the demand in individual
bases. Hence, to manage the demand variability of two or more
bases, it is possible to hold lower aggregate inventory in a single
facility than it is to hold each inventory separately.
This simple observation has powerful applications that are often
ignored. For instance, Tinker AFB does not have any assigned F-16
aircraft. However, considering its status as the maintenance depot
and its central location, it is conceivable to store all F-16 engines at
the depot, regardless of make, and ship them directly to the
respective base when needed. Pooling this demand under a single
inventory would reduce the safety stock, generating substantial
savings. Under this policy, the total inventory of Pratt & Whitney
engines necessary to satisfy demand (with the same degree of
conﬁdence in satisfying the demand in each base) would drop from
38 (see Table 2) engines to 18 engines, as shown in Table 3.
Likewise, GEAE engine inventory would drop from 48 to 20. These
inventory reductions would be credited exclusively to the pooling
effect; in other words, to achieve the same service level, a
centralized (or pooled) inventory requires a smaller safety stock
than a distributed (or pre-positioned) inventory. In addition to
adopting a centralized inventory, if the engines were designed
using an open architecture, we would be able to reduce the
inventory further, from 38 to 35 engines. The safety stock would
reduce by 30%, from 10 to 7 units. Open architecture would require
that P&W and GEAE engines could be used interchangeably in any
airframe.
There are a few weaknesses associated with central storage
solution. Considering that it is necessary to ensure that the drive
time to receive the engine when ordered from the ﬁeld is less than
1 day, inventory consolidation at only one central location might
not meet the operational needs: it would impose up to a 3-day
traveling time between the inventory and some users, compromising their readiness. However, according to users in the ﬁeld,
one business day (550 miles driving distance or less) is an
acceptable traveling time for a replacement engine.
Proponents of pre-positioning will point to availability (or
readiness) as one of its greatest beneﬁts. However, just as the
centralization of the inventory in a single location is inefﬁcient,
pre-positioning is costly and may expose the user to potentially
lower inventory availability (due to increased demand variability)
unless there is an additional investment in safety stock. The
following section shows an alternative approach that does not
Table 3
Central storage of spare engines at Tinker AFB.
Inventory status: all replacement engines stored at Tinker AFB

Annual demand
Base stock
Safety stock
$ Safety stock

P&W

GEAE

Total

656
18
5
$16.4

773
20
5
$14.8

1429
38
10
$31.1

Inventory status: all replacement engines stored at Tinker AFB. OA allows
using engines of different makes in any F-16 airframe
All makes, common interface
Annual demand
Base stock
Safety stock
$ Safety stock

1429
35
7
$21.71

centralize the inventory in a single location, but in a few selected
locations. The solution combines some of the advantages of prepositioned inventories with the risk-pooling beneﬁts of an
aggregate storage plan.
6.2. Regional storage
Some of the risk pooling beneﬁts can be observed through
regional inventory storage. We identify this as the p-median
problem. A word of caution: a transportation model based on a
mixed-integer program would not be a useful approach to ﬁnd the
storage points in this problem for two main reasons: (1) The
problem is fairly complex to be analyzed using software typically
available to most managers (MS Excel and Solver). (2) Most
important, if every customer is also a potential sourcing point, and
the number of storage points is pre-determined but not preidentiﬁed, the solution process would encounter discontinuities
in the objective function. This would prevent us from ﬁnding the
optimal solution, even for a small problem with just 13
customers.
The heuristics popularized by Ardalan (1988) requires the
development of a table of distances between potential inventory
locations and users, as well as the assignment of weights to help
prioritize the decisions. It is a greedy procedure that sequentially
identiﬁes the locations that are closest to the most demanding
users until all warehouses are identiﬁed. In this problem, the table
of distances was created with Yahoo! Maps (http://maps.yahoo.
com). As recommended by the heuristic, an Ardalan table is
created as the product between the user’s demand (di), the table
of distances (xij) and a weight associated with that delivery (wj).
Because of existing resources at active duty bases, it is usually
more desirable to store engines there than at ANG or AFR.
Moreover, it is more desirable to store engines at Tinker AFB than
at any other AD base because it is the depot that provides major
maintenance support for the F-16 engines. Hence, this modiﬁed
Ardalan matrix assigns weights to the sources (wj) that act as a
‘‘source penalty,’’ rather than to customers, which would indicate
their priority levels. Since Tinker is the ideal source, its weight is
1. Other AD bases received a weight of 1.1, while the AFR and ANG
sites received a weight of 1.5. To create a distribution network for
k customers, this process generates a square matrix with k rows
and columns in which the value of each cell (aij) is determined by
the expression:
aij ¼ di xij wj
This matrix is the root of the procedure to identify a set of
storage locations that require low transportation time to the
respective users and provide the beneﬁt of inventory aggregation.
The following steps identify an efﬁcient set of storage locations:
Step 1: Let s ¼1. This variable is the number of storage points at
the end of this round.
P
Step 2: Generate the value Aj ¼ i aij , the weighted sum of all
shipments from storage point j to each customer i.
Step 3: Identify Am ¼Min{A1,y, Ak  s + 1}. Column m deﬁnes the
least onerous storage location in round s.
Step 4: Move column m to the end of the matrix.
Step 5: For each cell (i,j) that satisﬁes jrk  s, let
aij ¼Min{aij,amj}.
Step 6: If a stopping point is reached, stop. Otherwise, let
s ¼s+ 1 and repeat steps 2–5.
The stopping point could be, for instance, a pre-established
number of storage facilities or some capacity limitation. In this
case, since this is a distance-constrained problem, we added
storage points until all users were served by inventories within a
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1-day drive (approximately a 550-mile distance). However, as any
heuristics, some exception may be necessary to ensure that it
ﬁnds a solution that is efﬁcient (low cost) and effective (meets all
practical constraints). Consequently, we added another twist:
each low-cost location found with the heuristic is selected as a
new storage point only if it increases the network coverage, i.e.,
one or both conditions are satisﬁed: (1) the low-cost location
is not within range from any of the existing storage locations or
(2) the low-cost location is within range from a customer that
cannot be served by any of the existing storage locations. If these

Table 4
Heuristic application to the Pratt & Whitney spare engines allocation problem.
Lowest choice location is shown in parentheses, if different from selected site.
Heuristic
round

Lowest cost
location

Selected distribution
sites

Users within range
from all sites

s¼1
s¼2
s¼3
s¼4
s¼5

LUF
TIK
BTV
HIF
DLH (LSV)

4
8
9
10
11

s¼6

FWA (LSV)

LUF
LUF, TIK
LUF, TIK, BTV
LUF, TIK, BTV, HIF
LUF, TIK, BTV, HIF,
DLH
LUF, TIK, BTV, HIF,
DLH, FWA

13 (all)

Fig. 1. Regional storage of Pratt & Whitney spare engines. All maps: storage
locations identiﬁed as a star with base stock in parentheses. Users identiﬁed as a
circle. Typical roads are shown.
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conditions are not satisﬁed, that low-cost location is not
contributing with the inventory-pooling objective, and the next
low-cost location is selected in its place.
The heuristics is illustrated with the allocation of the Pratt &
Whitney spare engines, in Table 4. All 13 customers are served
from 6 locations, shown in Fig. 1. Nellis AFB (LSV), located within
a 1-day drive distance from two previously assigned storage
locations (LUF and HIF), does not improve network coverage, so it
is not selected in rounds 5 and 6. The next lower-cost location in
each round, DLH (ANG-Duluth in Minnesota) and FWA (ANG-Ft
Wayne in Indiana) are selected instead. Notice that despite the
inventory pooling efforts, three locations (Hill AFB-Depot in Utah,
ANG-Duluth and ANG-Burlington in Vermont) store inventory for
just their needs, because of their distance to other bases using the
same engine type.
Once the low cost storage locations are identiﬁed, each user i is
assigned to the storage location j that satisﬁes the equation
aij ¼Min{ai,k  s + 1,ai,k}. Each storage location holds the inventory to
meet the demand for all users assigned to it, in addition to a safety
stock based on the aggregate demand variability in the bases
supplied by that location, and on the lead-time for that location to
resupply from the central depot in Tinker.
Locations holding inventory for multiple users beneﬁt from the
pooling effect already discussed. For example, Luke AFB (LUF)
holds inventory for its needs and for three other bases. The
standard error of the forecasted annual demand (260 business
days) from each of these bases range between 10.3 and 19.1.
However, the standard error of the aggregate demand is just 31.4.
Considering a lead-time of 6 business days from TIK (the depot) to
LUF, the safety stock to meet the demand variability of all four
bases is just 4.9 units. Also, the aggregate expected demand from
the four users is 440 units per year (or 10.2 units during the leadtime), which leads to a base stock of 16 ( ¼4.9 +10.2) units.
Detailed information about the inventory allocations appears in
Table 5.
Using the heuristic to assign storage points for GEAE spare
engines, eight storage locations are sequentially identiﬁed
(Table 6). In this case, no exceptions are necessary, since every
allocation suggested by the heuristic expands the network
coverage—adding at least one base to within the 1-day delivery
threshold. In this analysis, eight bases are needed to hold the
inventory for 19 bases using GEAE engines (Fig. 2). Again,
two bases (AFR-Homestead FL and ANG-Montgomery AL) hold

Table 5
Regional storage of Pratt & Whitney spare engines.
Source: The author.
Pratt & Whitney (F-100 engine)
Base

Luke AFB AZ
ANG-Tucson AZ
Nellis AFB NV
ANG-Fresno CA
Tinker AFB OK
ANG-Des Moines IA
ANG-Ft Smith AR
ANG-Ellington TX
ANG-Tulsa OK
ANG-Burlington VT
Hill AFB-Depot UT
ANG-Duluth MN
ANG-Ft Wayne IN
ANG-Toledo OH
Note: Storage locations in bold.

ICAO

LUF
TUS
LSV
FAT
TIK
DSM
FSM
EFD
TUL
BTV
HIF
DLH
FWA
TOL

2008 forecast

2008 inventory

Distance from inventory (mile)

Mean

Base stock

Safety stock

248.1
80.1
69.9
41.4
0.0
8.9
17.1
33.4
4.9
34.9
67.7
23.0
25.7
1.3

16
At LUF
At LUF
At LUF
3
At TIK
At TIK
At TIK
At TIK
3
3
2
2
At FWA

4.9

1.8

1.1
1.1
1.1
1.3

0
145
278
579
0
545
183
467
119
0
0
0
0
98
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inventory exclusively for their needs because of their distance to
other bases using the same engine. Table 7 shows storage points,
the size and the distance from each base to the respective
inventories.
As the analysis shows, regional storage reduces the safety
stock of P&W engines from 18 to 11 engines and the safety stock
of GEAE engines from 22 to 15 engines, in contrast to the fully

Table 6
Heuristic application to the GEAE spare engines allocation problem.
Heuristic
round

Lowest cost
location

Selected distribution points

s¼1
s¼2
s¼3
s¼4
s¼5
s¼6
s¼7

TIK
HIF
ADW
SGH
HST
MGM
CVS

s¼8

FSD

TIK
TIK, HIF
TIK, HIF, ADW
TIK, HIF, ADW,
TIK, HIF, ADW,
TIK, HIF, ADW,
TIK, HIF, ADW,
CVS
TIK, HIF, ADW,
CVS, FSD

Users within
range

4
6
12
SGH
14
SGH, HST
15
SGH, HST, MGM 16
SGH, HST, MGM, 17
SGH, HST, MGM, 19 (all)

distributed storage of engines shown in Table 2. By pooling the
demand from each base into a limited number of storage points,
the coefﬁcient of variation of the forecasted demand is reduced,
which leads to lower safety stock requirement and substantial
savings. This inventory allocation requires that two users
(ANG-Des Moines in Iowa and ANG-Great Falls in Montana) be
served by inventory located more than 500 miles away, but no
more than 600 miles from the user. Yet, this allocation allows all
bases to receive their spare engines within 1 day.
6.3. Regional storage with open architecture beneﬁt
The regional storage performance could be substantially
improved if the engines were designed with an open architecture
mindset. Without OA, the inventory distribution in Figs. 1 and 2
beneﬁts only from the regional pooling effect, observed when we
aggregate the demand for identical items from customers in close
proximity. In addition to the beneﬁts associated with simpler
design and maintenance of these complex assets, the adoption of
open architecture would increase the number of bases in some
geographic regions that could be served by the same storage
Table 8
Heuristic application to the complete spare engines allocation problem.
Heuristic
round

Lowest cost
location

Selected distribution
points

Users within
range

s ¼1
s ¼2
s ¼3
s ¼4
s ¼5
s ¼6

ABQ
ADW
HIF
LUF
TIK
FWA

6
15
18
19
24
26

s ¼7

FSD

s ¼8

HST

s ¼9

MGM

ABQ
ABQ, ADW
ABQ, ADW, HIF
ABQ, ADW, HIF, LUF
ABQ, ADW, HIF, LUF, TIK
ABQ, ADW, HIF, LUF, TIK,
FWA
ABQ, ADW, HIF, LUF, TIK,
FWA, FSD
ABQ, ADW, HIF, LUF, TIK,
FWA, FSD, HST
ABQ, ADW, HIF, LUF, TIK,
FWA, FSD, HST, MGM

28
29
30 (all)

Fig. 2. Regional storage of General Electric spare engines.

Table 7
Regional storage of General Electric spare engines.
Source: The author.
General Electric (F-110 engine)
Base

Tinker AFB OK
ANG-Kelly TX
AFR-Ft Worth TX
Hill AFB UT
ANG-Gt Falls MT
ANG-Andrews DC
ANG-Eggharbo NJ
ANG-Syracuse NY
ANG-Richmond VA
ANG-Springﬁeld OH
ANG-Selfridge MI
ANG-Springﬁeld IL
AFR-Homestead FL
ANG-Montgomery AL
Cannon AFB NM
ANG-Albuquerque NM
ANG-Buckley CO
ANG-Sioux SD
ANG-Madison WI
Note: Storage locations in bold.

ICAO

TIK
SKF
NFW
HIF
GTF
ADW
ACY
SYR
RIC
SGH
MTC
SPI
HST
MGM
CVS
ABQ
BKF
FSD
MSN

2008 forecast

2008 inventory

Distance from inventory (mile)

Mean

Base stock

Safety stock

0.0
45.1
21.1
217.0
44.4
25.0
19.4
38.5
8.7
51.3
30.1
31.0
28.4
37.3
48.9
31.3
27.4
41.0
26.4

3
At TIK
At TIK
11
At HIF
5
At ADW
At ADW
At ADW
5
At SGH
At SGH
2
3
5
At CVS
At CVS
3
At FSD

1.2

3.5
2.3

1.8

0.8
1.5
2.0

1.4

0
485
211
0
544
0
168
386
122
0
253
347
0
0
0
220
493
0
429
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location, adding another dimension of supply-chain aggregation
to reduce the need for safety stock. This pooling effect created by
open architecture is called product aggregation: different products
that are perfect substitutes can be held as a single inventory pool.
This aggregation has the same pooling effect as when we pool
inventories from different locations.
The same heuristic used earlier to ﬁnd separate inventory
storage can be used to ﬁnd storage locations for spare engines
built using open architecture. The separate inventory allocation
required 6 bases for P&W engines and 8 bases for GEAE engines.
The joint allocation proceeds as shown in Table 8. In this
environment, engines from either manufacturer could be used
in any airframe. To meet the demand of all 30 bases from

Fig. 3. Regional storage of spare engines with OA beneﬁt.
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locations within a 1-day drive, nine storage points sufﬁce, shown
in Fig. 3. Among the selected storage points, there are three Active
Duty bases, one Air Force Reserve and ﬁve Air National Guard
sites. Notice that among the ANG bases, there are two that are colocated with AD bases (ANG-Albuquerque in New Mexico and
ANG-Andrews in District of Columbia). These may enjoy some
support from this arrangement. Detailed information about the
inventory allocation is in Table 9.
Open architecture increases the population density of users
that can be served from the same overall inventory pool. In the
original allocation, there were 12 bases storing spare engines (two
of them storing both types), which amounted to 14 different
inventory pools. With this approach, only nine inventory pools
are necessary. Note that only two bases (ANG-Montgomery in
Alabama and AFR-Homestead in Florida) remain isolated, holding
just the engines required for their operation. This is quite an
improvement from the previous solution without OA, with ﬁve
isolated locations. Table 10 summarizes the performance of
regionalized storage with and without the beneﬁt of open
architecture. Thanks to this added level of aggregation, the total
safety stock necessary to absorb the variability of demand in 30
bases is now just 21 units, contrasting quite favorably with the
safety stock of 40 engines in the distributed mode based on
current policy (Table 2).
As Fig. 3 shows, the use of open architecture greatly improves
the distribution network in the Northeast, Southwest, the Midwest and in the central part of the country, where four storage
locations (Tinker AFB, Luke AFB, Andrews AFB and ANG-Fort
Wayne) serve 20 bases. On the downside, three bases are served
by inventory located between 500 and 580 miles away, stressing

Table 9
Regional storage of spare engines with OA beneﬁt.
Source: The author.
Base

ANG-Albuquerque NM
Cannon AFB NM
ANG-Buckley CO
ANG-Andrews DC
ANG-Richmond VA
ANG-Syracuse NY
ANG-Egg Harbor NJ
ANG-Burlington VT
Hill AFB UT
ANG-Gt Falls MT
Luke AFB AZ
ANG-Fresno CA
Nellis AFB NV
ANG-Tucson AZ
Tinker AFB OK
ANG-Ellington TX
ANG-Ft Smith AR
AFR-Ft Worth TX
ANG-Kelly TX
ANG-Tulsa OK
ANG-Ft Wayne IN
ANG-Madison WI
ANG-Selfridge MI
ANG-Springﬁeld OH
ANG-Springﬁeld IL
ANG-Toledo OH
ANG-Sioux SD
ANG-Duluth MN
ANG-Des Moines IA
AFR-Homestead FL
ANG-Montgomery AL
Note: Storage locations in bold.

ICAO

ABQ
CVS
BKF
ADW
RIC
SYR
ACY
BTV
HIF
GTF
LUF
FAT
LSV
TUS
TIK
EFD
FSM
NFW
SKF
TUL
FWA
MSN
MTC
SGH
SPI
TOL
FSD
DLH
DSM
HST
MGM

2008 forecast

2008 inventory

Distance from inventory (mile)

Mean

Base stock

Safety stock

31.3
48.9
27.4
25.0
8.7
38.5
19.4
34.9
284.7
44.4
248.1
41.4
69.9
80.1
0.0
33.4
17.1
21.1
45.1
4.9
25.7
26.4
30.1
51.3
31.0
1.3
41.0
23.0
8.9
28.4
37.3

5
At ABQ
At ABQ
6
At ADW
At ADW
At ADW
At ADW
12
At HIF
16
At LUF
At LUF
At LUF
4
At TIK
At TIK
At TIK
At TIK
At TIK
7
At FWA
At FWA
At FWA
At FWA
At FWA
4
At FSD
At FSD
2
3

2.2

2.6

2.9
4.9

2.0

2.4

1.8

0.8
1.5

0
220
453
0
122
386
168
523
0
544
0
579
278
145
0
467
183
211
485
119
0
321
194
141
328
98
0
396
292
0
0
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the operational constraint in this distribution process. However,
most users sit within a 1-day drive from one or more additional
storage points. Consequently, the safety stock necessary to
manage the demand variability of all 30 bases, which used to be
40 units in the original allocation (see Table 2), is now just 21
units. Considering that the average engine costs the DoD
approximately $3.1M, this reduction accounts as direct savings
of $58.8M—a savings due to the adoption of open architecture in a
regionalized inventory distribution.
6.4. Summary of results
The current distribution of spare engines for F-16s was used
to illustrate and evaluate the beneﬁts of place and product
aggregation. Starting from the status quo, in which the inventory
is locally distributed in the hands of each user, and considering
that there are two engine makes (Pratt & Whitney and General
Electric) that are not interchangeable, we evaluated four alternative distribution models representing different aggregation
approaches: with or without open architecture (product aggregation) and centralized or regionalized distribution (place aggregation). As expected, both types of aggregations provided inventory
reduction. What perhaps was not expected was the dimension of
the safety stock reduction (Table 11).

Table 10
Regional storage of spare engines.
INVENTORY

STATUS:

replacement engines stored at a limited number of bases

Number of storage bases
Annual demand
Base stock
Safety stock
Safety stock value

P&W

GEAE

Total

6
656
29
11
$36.0M

8
773
37
15
$44.3M

12
1429
66
26
$80.3M

Inventory status: replacement engines stored at a limited number of bases. OA
allows using engines of different makes in any F-16 airframe
All makes, common interface
Number of storage bases
Annual demand
Base stock
Safety stock
Safety stock value

9
1429
59
21
$65.1M

Table 11
Performance of different aggregation approaches.
Product aggregation
Open architecture

Proprietary design

Storage points: 1
Safety stock: 7
Safety stock value: $21.7M
Demand-miles: 1412 k

Storage points: 1
Safety stock: 10
Safety stock value: $31.1M
Demand-miles: 141 2k

Regional

Storage points: 9
Safety stock: 21
Safety stock value: $65.1M
Demand-miles: 1.554 k

Storage points: 12
Safety stock: 26
Safety stock value: $80.3M
Demand-miles: 1512 k

Local

Storage points: 30
safety stock: 38
safety stock value: $117.2M
demand-miles: 1412 k

Storage points: 30
safety stock: 40
safety stock value: $123.9M
demand-miles: 1412 k

Place aggregation
Central

One important concern is the impact on transportation costs.
To facilitate comparison, the analysis included a measure of
expected miles driven to each facility, considering that each
engine would generally be transported from the main depot to a
regional storage base, and then to the user. The baseline measure
of 1.41 million miles is the product between the number of units
shipped and the distance traveled. This total is the same, whether
the storage is centralized or distributed. Pooling the storage into
12 bases (without open architecture) would increase the distance
driven—and the transportation cost—to 1.51 million miles.
If the storage is pooled into just 9 bases (with open architecture),
the distance driven is increased to 1.55 million miles—10% more
than the baseline, to obtain a 47% safety stock reduction.

7. Conclusions and future research
An important concern in supply-chain management is the
identiﬁcation of aggregation opportunities that exist in the
design, storage and distribution of goods to the ﬁnal customer.
This aggregation, or pooling, can take place in three dimensions:
time aggregation, place aggregation and product aggregation. The
manager should evaluate the trade-offs in each of these aggregation opportunities in order to implement the correct product
design, storage and distribution procedures. Time aggregation
implies that the inventory is kept to meet the demand over longer
or shorter periods of time. Place aggregation implies that the
inventory is designed to meet the demand over one or many
markets. Finally, product aggregation implies that a product or
component is designed to meet the demand associated with one
or more applications. When any or all of these aggregations are
viable, the company enjoys substantial operational savings due to
the reduction of safety stock; in addition, much of the coordination effort may be reduced.
This paper analyzes the case of the F-16 spare engine storage
to illustrate two types of pooling beneﬁts: by place and by
product. Here, product aggregation is achieved with the adoption
of open architecture in product design. Place aggregation is
achieved with judicious use of the classic Ardalan (1988)
heuristics subject to a distance constraint, necessary to ensure
the desired performance level. We draw several important lessons
from this study:
Open architecture is an effective means of product aggregation
to facilitate supply-chain improvement for valuable complex
assets.
Open architecture can be leveraged by place aggregation when
the asset is used by several facilities geographically distributed.
Open architecture provides the greatest inventory reduction
beneﬁt when storage can be centralized. If centralization is not
desirable, it can still provide substantial beneﬁts, by judicious
identiﬁcation of a regional cluster of users to share joint
inventory.
Reduction in the number of storage points generally increases
transportation cost. Hence, it is important to evaluate the tradeoff between simpliﬁed infrastructure and reduced investment in
inventories against increases in transportation cost.
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the economic impact of
adopting open architecture in the design of complex assets to
reduce the lifecycle cost of maintaining those assets. The adoption
of open architecture affects several economic components in the
life of the asset, including developmental costs, maintenance
costs, and inventory-management costs. This article focuses on
the beneﬁts of pooling the inventory necessary to meet the
demand of many users into a small number of storage sites with
product variety reduction obtained with open architecture.
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The example showcased in this analysis—distribution of spare
engines for the F-16 in continental United States—amply supports
open architecture as the design approach to reduce supply chain
expenditures without compromising the availability of valuable
assets. The relevance here is far beyond the potential savings that
the F-16 program could have enjoyed, but is a lesson for future
government programs—whether they are weapon systems or
other assets supplied by two or more qualiﬁed suppliers. Several
examples come to mind, among them unmanned aerial vehicles,
the space program and high-speed rail equipment.
More than 40 years since Hakimi (1965) ﬁrst formulated the
p-median problem, it is still necessary to warn managers in
government of the importance to use rigorous techniques to make
facility location decisions. Fok (2001) raised this issue, at the same
time that he recommended the use of accessible techniques, such
as the center of gravity method – for centralized storage – or the
Ardalan heuristics – for multi-facility storage, as is our case.
Future studies about the impact of open architecture on
complex systems should expand the analysis to incorporate
beneﬁts provided by simpliﬁed maintenance, as well as to
investigate the additional cost and time required to coordinate
the developmental efforts to ensure a common interface. On the
distribution side, the regular adoption of transshipment (lateral
shipment) or the use of multiple storage units should be studied
as alternatives to improve inventory pooling, and thus to enhance
the value of open architecture in future product development
programs.
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Nagy, Gábor, Salhi, Saı̈d, 2007. Location-routing: issues, models and methods.
European Journal of Operational Research 177, 649–672.
Nelson, Eric, 2007. Open Architecture Technical Principles and Guidelines (Ver.
1.5.4). International Business Machines Corporation, Armonk, New York.
PEO-IWS (Program Executive Ofﬁcer—Integrated Weapons System), 2006. Department of the Navy. Naval Open Architecture Contract Guidebook (Ver. 1.0)
(PEO-IWS 7). Available from: /https://acc.dau.mil/oaS.
Rahman, S., Smith, D.K., 1991. A comparison of two heuristic methods for the pmedian problem with and without maximum distance constraints. International Journal of Operations and Production Management 11 (6), 76–84.
Reese, J., 2005. Methods for solving the p-median problem: an annotated
bibliography. Manuscript, Trinity University, San Antonio, TX. Available from:
/http://ramanujan.math.trinity.edu/tumath/research/reports/report96.pdfS.
Sarmiento, A.M., Nagi, R.A., 1999. Review of integrated analysis of production–
distribution systems. IIE Transactions 31, 1061–1074.
Teitz, M.B., Bart, P., 1968. Heuristic methods for estimating the vertex median of a
weighted graph. Operations Research 12 (3), 955–961.
Tinker AFB, 2007. 448 Combat Sustainment Wing’s mission statement. Available
from: /http://www.tinker.af.mil/units/S.
Toregas, C., Swain, R.W., ReVelle, C.S., Bergman, L., 1971. The location of emergency
service facilities. Operations Research 19 (6), 1363–1373.
Vidal, C.J., Goetschalckx, M., 1997. Strategic production distribution models: a
critical review with emphasis on global supply chain models. European Journal
of Operational Research 98, 1–18.

